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Note 
Administrative Regulation of Arbitration 
Matteo Godi† 
In Epic Systems v. Lewis, a case on arbitration agreements and class 
action waivers, the U.S. Supreme Court tangentially addressed the intersection 
of arbitration and agency deference. The Court’s opinion highlighted a gap in 
legal scholarship: very little has been written on administrative regulation of 
arbitration. By cataloging for the first time the instances in which agencies have 
regulated arbitration over the last four decades, this Note strives to jumpstart 
the scholarly debate around administrative regulation of arbitration. In the face 
of decades-old agency rules, this Note shows why Epic Systems should not be 
interpreted to preempt regulations of arbitration pursuant to general delegations 
of rulemaking authority. Such an interpretation, which assumes the 
incompatibility of the agency-deference case law and the arbitration 
jurisprudence, clashes with longstanding Supreme Court precedent. 
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Introduction 
In May 2018, under the caption of Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, the U.S. 
Supreme Court heard three consolidated cases at the intersection of mandatory 
arbitration and employee class actions.1 On its face, Epic Systems concerned 
whether employment contracts containing class-action waivers are enforceable 
under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) or violate employees’ rights to 
collective action under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).2 But the case 
also provided the Court with an opportunity to adopt a new understanding of how 
the FAA interacts with agency rulemaking authority. In fact, the employers in 
Epic Systems argued that, unless the text of a federal statute includes a specific, 
express, textual delegation of authority to an agency over arbitration, no 
administrative limitation of arbitral procedures is permitted under the FAA.3 The 
Court’s opinion fell short of embracing that more sweeping line of argument. 
Instead, Justice Gorsuch held that the NLRA did not override the FAA and that, 
in any event, “even under Chevron’s terms, no deference is due” to the National 
Labor Relations Board’s interpretation of its statute as prohibiting arbitration.4 
To the Court, the absence of “any specific statutory discussion” of arbitration in 
the NLRA was an “important and telling clue.”5 
With its opinion in Epic Systems, the Court opened a line of communication 
between what, on their face, may appear to be competing subsets of its case law: 
arbitration doctrine and agency deference. In the administrative deference 
context, Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
prescribes certain instances in which a court must defer to an agency’s 
reasonable and permissible interpretation of an ambiguous substantive statute.6 
When it comes to administrative regulation of arbitration, Chevron’s default 
would appear to promote regulation, absent signs of congressional intent to 
mandate arbitration. On the arbitration jurisprudence front, Shearson/American 
Express, Inc. v. McMahon sets out a test to identify whether a statute conflicts 
with arbitration.7 In the face of a conflict between the FAA and another statute, 
McMahon’s default would appear to promote arbitration: courts are directed to 
 
 1.   See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017); NLRB v. Murphy Oil USA, 
Inc., 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017); Ernst & Young, LLP v. Morris, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017). 
 2.   Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018); see also 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2018) 
(“Employees shall have the right to . . . engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . . .”). 
 3.   See Brief for Petitioner Epic Systems Corp. and Respondent Murphy Oil USA, Inc. 
at 11, Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (No. 16-307); Brief for Petitioner Ernst & Young at 50, Epic Systems, 
138 S. Ct. 1612 (No. 16-307); see also Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America 
as Amicus Curiae at 21, 31, Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (No. 16-307). 
 4.   Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1629. 
 5.   Id. 
 6.   467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (outlining the familiar Chevron two-step test). 
 7.   482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987) (holding that intent to limit arbitration “will be deducible 
from the statute’s text or legislative history, or from an inherent conflict between arbitration and the 
statute’s underlying purposes”). 
 Administrative Regulation of Arbitration 
855 
look for congressional intent to preclude arbitration. As this Note explains, 
however, Epic Systems did not settle the boundaries of administrative regulation 
of arbitration. 
The absence of any clarity around how McMahon and its progeny interact 
with agency deference under Chevron has not gone completely unnoticed. Some 
judges have explicitly recognized the uncertainty surrounding the interaction of 
Chevron and McMahon,8 and a handful of commentators have noted the conflict 
too.9 To be sure, there is a wealth of scholarship on the historical or legislative 
support for the Court’s arbitration jurisprudence.10 And there is even more 
scholarly debate, especially from recent years, surrounding the wisdom of 
Chevron deference.11 But scholars have generally been uninterested in the 
regulation of arbitration,12 and agencies’ power to regulate arbitral procedures 
had received practically no attention until last year—when the first piece 
squarely addressing the topic was published. Although Daniel Deacon 
insightfully examines the various roles that federal administrative agencies play 
in arbitration by considering “a set of institutional questions,”13 he spends only 
a few pages on the topic of administrative regulation of arbitration.14 As Deacon 
also recognizes, some scholars have discussed this issue before, albeit 
tangentially: some narrowly focused on regulations of arbitration under the 
 
 8.   See, e.g., Seney v. Rent-A-Ctr., Inc., 738 F. 3d 631, 635 (4th Cir. 2013) (“The way 
in which Chevron squares with McMahon . . . is uncertain, and courts have divided on the question.”). 
 9.   See Daniel G. Lloyd, The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act v. the Federal Arbitration 
Act: The Quintessential Chevron Case, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 1, 5 (2002) (“[T]wo other federal 
titans will clash once the issue reaches the Supreme Court—Chevron and its progeny on one hand, and 
the ‘McMahon’ inquiry, which the Court systematically has used to strike down attempts to overcome the 
Arbitration Act, on the other.”); Jonathan D. Grossberg, Note, The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, the 
Federal Arbitration Act, and the Future of Consumer Protection, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 659, 667 (2008) 
(discussing the clash between Chevron and McMahon); Katie Wiechens, Comment, Arbitrating 
Consumer Claims Under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1459, 1464 (2001) 
(“[C]onsideration of agency regulations under McMahon absent a clear congressional delegation creates 
an unwieldy two-step inquiry that is exacerbated by the tension between McMahon and Chevron.”). 
 10.   See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the 
Legislative History of the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101, 108-16 (2002); Judith 
Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. 
Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 111-12 (2011). 
 11.   See, e.g., Nicholas Bednar & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Inevitability, 85 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1392 (2017); Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron 
Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779 (2010); Lisa Schultz 
Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549 (2009); Michael Herz, Chevron is Dead; Long Live 
Chevron, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1867 (2015); Brett Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. 
L. REV. 2118 (2016); Jonathan R. Siegel, The Constitutional Case for Chevron Deference, 71 VAND. L. 
REV. 937 (2018); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron as Law, 107 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2019). 
 12.   Daniel T. Deacon, Agencies and Arbitration, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 991, 994 (2017) 
(noting the absence of any literature on the topic). 
 13.   Id. at 994 & n.6 (noting how the “institutional-allocations questions at the heart of 
this Essay” are, for example, “whether agencies in particular should step into a greater regulatory role vis-
à-vis courts and Congress.”). 
 14.   Id. at 1014-20. A second piece, by David Noll, takes a more prescriptive approach, 
focusing on how arbitration affects the implementation of statutes that are enforced through private civil 
litigation. David L. Noll, Regulating Arbitration, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 985, 1009-37 (2017). 
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Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act,15 while a few others analyzed Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission guidance documents on arbitration.16 But 
that literature provides only a myopic view on the breadth of administrative 
regulation of arbitration. 
The appropriate judicial treatment of agency regulation of arbitration would 
be solely an academic exercise were it not for two overlooked facts: (1) agencies 
have long invoked their general regulatory authority to promulgate rules on 
arbitration, and (2) the Supreme Court has long blessed those exercises of 
delegated authority. To date, there has been no historical account of arbitration 
regulations and no comprehensive catalog of the different sets of agency rules in 
this arena.17 Instead, agencies continue to be mistakenly seen as actors that 
“ha[ve] begun to step in” to regulate arbitration only “[i]n recent years,”18 and 
scholars have tended to focus on just a handful of notable and somewhat unique 
regulatory examples.19 
In the hopes of propelling further debate on the regulation of arbitration, 
this Note’s main contribution is to debunk the myth that agencies are new to the 
arbitration game. I do so by cataloging the history of administrative regulation 
of arbitration. Over the last four decades, invoking their general or specific 
rulemaking authority, agencies have frequently stepped into the arbitration space 
and prescribed rules for arbitral procedures. What is more, the McMahon 
Court—just a couple of years after Chevron—openly embraced an agency’s 
“broad authority” to adopt any rules it deems necessary to ensure that “arbitration 
procedures adequately protect statutory rights.”20 
In the wake of Epic Systems, the intersection of the arbitration case law and 
the agency-deference jurisprudence deserves more scholarly attention. Agency 
rules on arbitration should not be dismissed as a recent trend incompatible with 
longstanding arbitration precedents. To support that argument, this Note is 
organized as follows. Part I offers a brief background on the FAA and the 
Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence. Part II takes stock of the degree to 
which, over the last forty years, various agencies have regulated arbitration 
 
 15.   See Marc E. Gunter, Note, Can Warrantors Make an End Run? The Magnuson-
Moss Act and Mandatory Arbitration in Written Warranties, 34 GA. L. REV. 1483 (2000); Andrew P. 
Lamis, The New Age of Artificial Legal Reasoning as Reflected in the Judicial Treatment of the 
Magnuson-Moss Act and the Federal Arbitration Act, 15 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 173 (2003); Lloyd, 
supra note 9, at 5-6; Wiechens, supra note 9, at 1464; Jaime L. Dodge, Note, Arbitration: Fifth Circuit 
Holds Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act Claims Arbitrable Despite Contrary Agency Interpretation—
Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1201 (2003); Grossberg, supra note 9, at 661-62. 
 16.   See Richard A. Bales, Compulsory Employment Arbitration and the EEOC, 27 
PEPP. L. REV. 1 (1999); Lynne M. Longtin, Comment, The EEOC’s Position on Mandatory Arbitration, 
67 U. CIN. L. REV. 265 (1998). 
 17.   For the only two lists (both brief and partial) of agency regulations on arbitration, 
see Deacon, supra note 12, at 1018-20, which largely focuses on the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau; and Deepak Gupta & Lina Khan, Arbitration as Wealth Transfer, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 499, 
501 (2017), which provides a short list of regulations promulgated “[i]n recent years.” 
 18.   Deacon, supra note 12, at 993. 
 19.   Id. at 1014-20; Noll, supra note 14, at 1037. 
 20.   Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 233-34 (1987). 
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within their respective spheres of competence. Part III discusses the few 
challenges to agencies’ ability to regulate arbitration, and it then rejects an 
interpretation of Epic Systems that would conjure a clash between administrative 
deference and arbitration doctrine. Finally, in the hope of fostering further debate 
on how courts should treat administrative rules on arbitration, the Conclusion 
gestures at one possible way to synthesize the Court’s arbitration and 
administrative deference cases—Chevron’s step-two analysis could be 
harmonized with the McMahon doctrine.21 
I. The Supreme Court’s Federal Arbitration Act 
While the FAA was enacted to give arbitration agreements the force of law 
(just as any other contract), the Supreme Court slowly transformed the statute 
into a super-statute. Through a process that resembled “common-law 
constitutional adjudication [more] than statutory interpretation,”22 the Court—in 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s words—started “building instead, case by case, 
an edifice of its own creation.”23 The history of the FAA’s transformation from 
a simple statute into a quasi-constitutional law capable of trumping any federal 
statute is remarkable. Because many have recounted it,24 this Part only surveys 
that history to inform the discussions in the remainder of this Note. 
A. The Federal Arbitration Act 
Although arbitration has been common in the United States ever since 
colonial times, its popularity stalled until the 1920s.25 Initially, federal and state 
courts refused to specifically enforce prospective agreements to arbitrate, 
following what had been the common law practice in England.26 Courts 
generally saw arbitration agreements as either “oust[ing] the courts of 
jurisdiction” or potentially “becom[ing] the instrument of injustice.”27 They 
 
 21.   Recently some scholars have been calling for a reshaping of Chevron’s step-two 
analysis. See generally Catherine M. Sharkey, Cutting in on the Chevron Two-Step, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1259 (2018) (advocating for the incorporation of State Farm hard-look review into Chevron step two). 
 22.   Deepak Gupta, Symposium: For Decades, Court Has Built “An Edifice of Its Own 




 23.   Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). 
 24.   See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 10, at 112-18. 
 25.   FRANCES KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION: ITS HISTORY, FUNCTIONS, AND 
ACHIEVEMENTS 4-8 (1948). 
 26.   See Tobey v. Cty. of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1319-20 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (Story, 
J.); see also Margaret M. Harding, The Clash Between Federal and State Arbitration Law and the 
Appropriateness of Arbitration as a Dispute Resolution Process, 77 NEB. L. REV. 397, 425-26 (1998). 
 27.   KATHERINE V.W. STONE & RICHARD A. BALES, ARBITRATION LAW 23 (2d ed. 
2010). 
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therefore “invented special rules, such as the ouster and revocability doctrines, 
to nullify contracts to arbitrate.”28 During the 1920s, however, as the result of an 
organized movement financed by various industries,29 some states adopted 
uniform arbitration statutes: Illinois (1917),30 New York (1920),31 New Jersey 
(1921),32 Massachusetts (1925),33 and Oregon (1925).34 These statutes not only 
changed the rule on the revocability of arbitration agreements, but also sought to 
encourage the use of arbitration.35 
Feeding off this growing momentum, more than 120 organizations led by 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the American Bar Association lobbied for 
a federal arbitration bill modeled after the New York statute.36 In those years, 
rules governing the enforcement of arbitration agreements were seen as 
procedural, not substantive.37 Accordingly, because federal courts declined to 
apply state arbitration statutes, Congress’s intervention was needed to make 
arbitration agreements enforceable in federal court.38 Reformers acting through 
the American Bar Association presented full drafts of their proposed legislation 
to Congress.39 
For what the sparse legislative history of the FAA is worth, it only shows 
Congress’s understanding of what the American Bar Association reformers were 
proposing, rather than providing a window into legislative intent. These 
organizations’ main goal was to reverse “the hoary doctrine that agreements for 
arbitration are revocable at will and are unenforceable.”40 In fact, the House 
Report identified the purpose of the bill as making “valid and enforcible [sic] 
agreements for arbitration.”41 The Report further explained that “[a]rbitration 
agreements are purely matters of contract, and the effect of the bill is simply to 
make the contracting party live up to his agreement.”42 In other words, through 
the Act, an “arbitration agreement is placed upon the same footing as other 
 
 28.   David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 444-45 (2011). 
 29.   Charles Newton Hulvey, Arbitration of Commercial Disputes, 15 VA. L. REV. 238, 
243 (1929). 
 30.   1917 Ill. Laws 202. 
 31.   1920 N.Y. Laws 803. 
 32.   1923 N.J. Laws 291. 
 33.   MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 294, § 1 (1925). 
 34.   1925 Or. Laws 279. 
 35.   W.F. Dodd, Significant Phases of Current Legislation, 6 AM. BAR ASSN. J. 18, 20 
(1920) (discussing arbitration laws in New York and Illinois). 
 36.   IMRE SZALAI, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE: THE RISE OF MODERN ARBITRATION LAWS 
IN AMERICA 56-70 (2013); see also Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Hearing of S. 1005 
and H.R. 646 Before the J. Comm. of Subcomms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 16 (1924). 
 37.   Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 286-88 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
 38.   Drahozal, supra note 10, at 126-27. 
 39.   1 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 10.2, at 10 (1999). 
 40.   Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. 
L. REV. 265, 265 (1926). 
 41.   H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924). 
 42.   Id. 
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contracts, where it belongs.”43 But few other insights may be drawn from the 
legislative history.44 
After years of lobbying by business groups,45 the FAA was enacted in 
1925—practically unchanged from the draft that the American Bar Association 
presented.46 On its face, the FAA provides that arbitration agreements “shall be 
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any contract.”47 Notably, the Act also includes an 
exception: “nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of 
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or 
interstate commerce.”48 Over the years, however, the Supreme Court 
significantly reshaped the scope of this language. 
B. A Liberal Federal Policy Favoring Arbitration: From Sub-Contracts to 
Super-Contracts 
After some initial skepticism, the Supreme Court proceeded to transform 
the FAA into a quasi-constitutional norm. At first, federal courts refrained from 
applying the FAA broadly. In Wilko v. Swan, the Supreme Court declined to 
enforce an arbitration agreement that waived certain substantive rights under the 
Securities Exchange Act.49 As a result, expanding on Wilko’s suspicion that 
arbitrators might give short shrift to statutory rights, federal courts found any 
number of statutory claims to be nonarbitrable.50 But soon things began to 
change. In subsequent cases, the Court made three moves, holding that the FAA 
(i) is a substantive law applicable to the states, (ii) establishes a liberal federal 
policy favoring arbitration over federal and state statutory rights, and (iii) applies 
beyond intermerchant contract disputes and admiralty claims. 
First, a series of Supreme Court decisions transformed the FAA from a 
procedural into a substantive law applicable to the states. In Prima Paint, the 
Court concluded that the FAA could prevail in a diversity case because “it is 
clear beyond dispute that the federal arbitration statute is based upon and 
confined to the incontestable federal foundations of control over interstate 
 
 43.   Id. 
 44.   AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 346 n.5 (2011); Circuit City 
Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119-21 (2001). 
 45.   IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, 
NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION 84-101 (1992). 
 46.   United States Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as 
amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2018)). 
 47.   9 U.S.C. § 2 (2018).   
 48.   Id. § 1. 
 49.   346 U.S. 427, 430 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. 
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989). 
 50.   See generally Stewart E. Sterk, Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate: An 
Examination of the Public Policy Defense, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 481 (1981) (surveying cases in various 
areas of law—including family law, antitrust law, patent law, securities, ERISA, and bankruptcy—in 
which federal courts declined to enforce arbitration). 
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 36, 2019 
860 
commerce and over admiralty.”51 A decade later, as dicta in Moses H. Cone, the 
FAA became a substantive statute that could be applied in state court.52 In that 
same opinion, the Court created the famous “liberal federal policy favoring 
arbitration agreements.”53 
Second, with the Court’s creation of the “liberal federal policy favoring 
arbitration agreements,”54 the FAA’s power as a trump card quickly grew 
exponentially. The first big step came in Mitsubishi, where the Court concluded 
that the FAA also applies to issues arising out of antitrust law (and not just 
contract and maritime claims).55 In McMahon, the FAA was found applicable to 
claims under the Securities Exchange Act and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act;56 in Gilmer, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
followed;57 and in Vimar, the Court added the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act to 
the list.58 Indeed, the Court wrote in 1991, “[i]t is by now clear that statutory 
claims may be the subject of an arbitration agreement, enforceable pursuant to 
the FAA.”59 Another big jump occurred in Southland, where the Court held that 
the FAA was enforceable in both state and federal courts.60 It was only a matter 
of time before the Court could conclude that, when the liberal federal policy in 
favor of arbitration clashes with generally applicable state laws, the FAA 
prevails.61 
 
 51.   Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 405 (1967). 
 52.   Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) 
(“Federal law in the terms of the Arbitration Act governs [arbitrability] in either state or federal court . . . . 
Section 2 is a Congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, 
notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary. The effect of the section is to 
create a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within the 
coverage of the Act.”). 
 53.   Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24. This statement might have resulted from a 
misapplication of the national labor policy favoring collective bargaining agreements. Indeed, a few years 
after Moses H. Cone, the Mitsubishi Court cited both Moses H. Cone and a labor arbitration case to support 
that liberal federal policy. See Mitsubishi Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985) 
(citing Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960)). In that labor case, 
the Court held that “[a]n order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless . . . the 
arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute,” and therefore 
doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage. Steelworkers, 363 U.S. at 583. But, as many commentators 
have pointed out, that analogy was mistaken. See, e.g., Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: 
How the Supreme Court Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 99, 124 (2006); David S. Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation: 
The Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration Act, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 43-44 (2004). 
Arbitration pursuant to collective bargaining agreements is part of a substantive national labor policy in 
the sense that is represents “a quid pro quo for a union’s giving up the right to strike,” thus promoting 
industrial stabilization; arbitration under the FAA, instead, is simply an alternative to litigation. Schwartz, 
supra, at 43-44. 
 54.   Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24. 
 55.   Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637-38. 
 56.   Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 241-42 (1987). 
 57.   Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
 58.   Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995). 
 59.   Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26. 
 60.   Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984). 
 61.   AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 341 (2011). 
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Third, in addition to expanding the FAA’s ability to trump any conflicting 
statutory right, the Court also broadened the statute’s scope. Albeit scarce, the 
legislative history suggests that Congress, in enacting the FAA, intended to allow 
arbitration for a narrow set of legal claims: intermerchant contract disputes and 
admiralty claims.62 As Rep. George Scott Graham (R-PA) noted during the 
congressional debate over the FAA, the Act “simply provide[d] for one thing, 
and that [wa]s to give an opportunity to enforce an agreement in commercial 
contracts and admiralty contracts.”63 Reflecting this understanding, the statutory 
text made clear that “nothing” in the FAA “shall apply to contracts of 
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers 
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”64 Yet, Circuit City held that the FAA 
also applies to employment contracts—dismissing any contrary legislative 
history as something the Court “need not assess.”65 To be sure, though, that 
exception for foreign or interstate workers has not been voided of any meaning: 
the Court has recently concluded that independent transportation contractors are 
exempt from the FAA.66 
In sum, the law of arbitration is clear: the FAA is a quasi-constitutional law. 
Or, to borrow Justice Gorsuch’s language in Epic Systems: whenever a statute 
tries to “conjure conflicts” with the FAA, the Court will always rule in favor of 
arbitration—as it has done in “every such effort to date.”67 
 
 62.   Christopher R. Leslie, The Arbitration Bootstrap, 94 TEX. L. REV. 265, 307 (2015). 
 63.   65 CONG. REC. 1931 (1924) (remarks of Rep. Graham). Indeed, “even a cursory 
review of the FAA’s legislative history reveals that Congress did not want the statute to apply to contracts 
between parties with unequal bargaining power.” Horton, supra note 28, at 447. Labor unions, and in 
particular the seamen’s union, initially objected because the first draft facially applied to seamen and 
workers. See Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal Commercial 
Arbitration: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th 
Cong. 9 (1923). One of the drafters of the Act, however, explained in front of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee that: “It is not intended that this shall be an act referring to labor disputes, at all. It is purely 
an act to give the merchants the right or the privilege of sitting down and agreeing with each other as to 
what their damages are, if they want to do it.” Id.; see also id. (“It was not the intention of this bill to make 
an industrial arbitration in any sense; and so . . . , if your honorable committee should feel that there is 
any danger of that, they should add to the bill the following language, ‘but nothing herein contained shall 
apply to seamen or any class of workers in interstate and foreign commerce.’”). Then-Secretary Herbert 
Hoover agreed with the drafters’ proposed solution: “If objection appears to the inclusion of workers’ 
contracts in the law’s scheme, it might be well amended by stating ‘but nothing herein contained shall 
apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged 
in interstate or foreign commerce.’” Id. at 14. 
 64.   9 U.S.C. § 1 (2018). 
 65.   Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001) (emphasis added). 
Resorting to a strict textualist interpretation, the Court appealed to the ejusdem generis canon of 
interpretation to conclude that the statutory language referring to “any other class of workers engaged in 
foreign or interstate commerce” should be limited to workers like seaman and railroad employees—
namely, transportation workers. Id. at 114-15. As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent, however, that 
“[h]istory amply supports the proposition that [Section 1 of the FAA] was an uncontroversial provision 
that merely confirmed the fact that no one interested in the enactment of the FAA ever intended or 
expected that § 2 would apply to employment contracts.” Id. at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 66.   Just a few months ago, with the first ruling against arbitration in decades, the Court 
concluded that the FAA’s reference to “contracts of employment” does not require a formal employer-
employee relationship. See New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 535 (2019). 
 67.   Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1627 (2018). 
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*  *  * 
 
The remainder of this Note will show how the regulatory state has 
interpreted this remarkable evolution of the FAA. Part II provides the first 
comprehensive discussion of administrative regulation of arbitral procedures: it 
outlines all instances in which agencies have regulated arbitration by invoking 
either their specific or general rulemaking authorities. Part III discusses the few 
challenges to agency rules on arbitration, and it then outlines why interpreting 
Epic Systems to embrace the need for an explicit congressional delegation of 
rulemaking authority in order to regulate arbitration would clash with the Court’s 
own arbitration case law. 
II. Administrative Rules on Arbitration 
Against the backdrop of Part I, the wealth of administrative regulations on 
arbitration procedures and the lack of attention to them in legal scholarship are 
puzzling.68 Recently, one scholar has started the important conversation on 
agencies and arbitration by “shift[ing] the focus from the courts”—because, “[i]n 
recent years, a different set of actors has begun to step in and address the issues 
raised by arbitration: federal administrative agencies.”69 Yet, as Epic Systems 
testifies, it is more important than ever to keep our eyes on the courts. And, 
moreover, that proposed shift away from the judiciary is founded on mistaken 
premises—that agencies are new to the arbitration game.70 The misconception is 
understandable, for no one has yet provided a comprehensive account of 
administrative regulations on arbitration, and commentators have focused 
instead (almost exclusively) on the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.71 But 
agencies are not just beginning to regulate arbitration. Rather, they have done so 
for decades—for so long that, over three decades ago, the Supreme Court blessed 
that administrative authority despite the FAA.72 
This Part, then, addresses the main shortcoming in this nascent scholarly 
debate, in the hope of inviting future discussions on this important topic. This 
Part sets out a collection of administrative rules on arbitration. Agencies have 
long regulated arbitration either by invoking their general authority to organize 
certain industries or by following Congress’s specific instructions to regulate 
arbitration. Sometimes they have prohibited or limited arbitration; other times 
 
 68.   See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 69.   See Deacon, supra note 12, at 993. 
 70.   See also Noll, supra note 14, at 987 (“In recent years, policymakers in Congress 
and federal administrative agencies have begun to perform a fundamentally new function: regulating 
arbitration agreements.”); cf. Deacon, supra note 12, at 1007. 
 71.   See Deacon, supra note 12, at 1014-20; Noll, supra note 14, at 1037. A few other 
pieces of scholarship have been published on the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. See supra note 15 and 
accompanying text. 
 72.   Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 223 (1987). 
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they have simply defined arbitral procedures. Section II.A focuses on those few 
instances in which Congress specifically instructed agencies to regulate 
arbitration, while Section II.B discusses the more interesting category of agency 
rules promulgated pursuant to an agency’s general rulemaking authority. It is this 
latter set of regulations that will be at the center of Part III. 
A. Regulations Promulgated Under Specific Delegated Authority  
In limited cases, a lack of regulation has led Congress to mandate explicitly 
that agencies take active steps to regulate arbitration. For example, in 2006, 
Congress reacted to reports that predatory lenders were targeting military 
members to such an alarming degree that their activities constituted a threat to 
national security.73 Congress’s response was the Military Lending Act, banning 
mandatory arbitration in consumer loans to service members.74 In turn, the 
Department of Defense exercised its authority to issue regulations expanding the 
scope of that ban.75 Similarly, with the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 
2008, Congress wanted to ensure that farmers could decline arbitration over 
disputes with livestock dealers.76 The Agency considered “prohibiting the use 
of arbitration to resolve disputes” but found that ban at odds with “a popular 
method of dispute resolution in other industries.”77 So the Department of 
Agriculture regulated the ability of companies to force arbitration on livestock 
producers and poultry farmers by requiring that production contracts include a 
notice of the right to decline arbitration in bold print and an additional opt-in 
signature at the end of the contract.78 Under that rule, the absence of a signature 
constitutes a rejection of the arbitration clause.79 Lastly, when Congress 
established the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, it required the new 
 
 73.   See Report on Predatory Lending Practices Directed at Members of the Armed 
Forces and Their Dependents, DEP’T OF DEFENSE (Aug. 9, 2006), 
http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Report_to_Congress_final.pdf [http://perma.cc/UJ8Z-2SG9]; see 
also Christopher Lewis Peterson & Steve Graves, Predatory Lending and the Military: The Law and 
Geography of “Payday” Loans in Military Towns, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 653 (2005). 
 74.   See 10 U.S.C. § 987(e) (2018). 
 75.   See 32 C.F.R. § 232.9(d) (2018) (“Notwithstanding 9 U.S.C. [§] 2, or any other 
Federal or State law, rule, or regulation, no agreement to arbitrate any dispute involving the extension of 
consumer credit to a covered borrower pursuant to this part shall be enforceable against any covered 
borrower, or any person who was a covered borrower when the agreement was made.”). 
 76.   7 U.S.C. § 197c (2018). 
 77.   75 Fed. Reg. 35,338, 35,345 (June 22, 2010). 
 78.   9 C.F.R. § 201.218(a) (2018) (“In any livestock or poultry production contract that 
requires the use of arbitration the following language must appear on the signature page of the contract in 
bold conspicuous print: ‘Right to Decline Arbitration. A poultry grower, livestock producer or swine 
production contract grower has the right to decline to be bound by the arbitration provisions set forth in 
this agreement. A poultry grower, livestock producer or swine production contract grower shall indicate 
whether or not it desires to be bound by the arbitration provisions by signing one of the following 
statements; failure to choose an option will be treated as if the poultry grower, livestock producer or swine 
production contract grower declined to be bound by the arbitration provisions set forth in this Agreement 
. . . .’”). 
 79.   See 9 C.F.R. § 201.218(a) (2018). 
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agency to study the spread of mandatory arbitration and, if warranted, regulate 
it.80 
Courts have never considered challenges to these explicit congressional 
delegations of rulemaking authority over arbitration. The reason why is simple: 
Congress certainly has the authority to instruct agencies expressly to regulate 
arbitration, notwithstanding the FAA. The Supreme Court has recognized just as 
much in a number of instances, most recently in Epic Systems.81 The remainder 
of this Note, therefore, focuses on the more interesting, and much more 
prevalent, set of regulatory interventions: those pursuant to a general delegation 
of rulemaking authority. 
B. Regulations Promulgated Under General Delegated Authority 
Over the last four decades, by relying on their general rulemaking authority, 
many federal agencies have regulated arbitration—even though the substantive 
statutes they were interpreting did not explicitly mention arbitration. This 
Section describes the regulations of nine agencies. It divides them 
chronologically into two groups. 
Section II.B.1 discusses pre-2016 regulations promulgated by the Federal 
Trade Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Department 
of Labor, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Transportation, and 
the Department of Treasury—all of which remain on the books today. Some, 
such as the Labor and Agriculture rules, stemmed from a statutory right to seek 
review of adverse decisions; others, such as the Transportation and Treasury 
regulations, relied on more general delegations; and a few, such as the FTC’s 
rule, were based on more narrowly arbitration-focused, but still general, 
rulemaking authorities. 
Section II.B.2 examines regulations promulgated in 2016, including those 
of the Department of Labor, the Department of Education, the Department of 
Health and Human Services, and the Federal Communications Commission—all 
of which have been repealed. All of these rules, as discussed below, relied on 
rather broad delegations of authority. 
1. Pre-2016 Regulations 
Federal Trade Commission (1975). Over the past forty years, the Federal 
Trade Commission has promulgated rules restricting the use of mandatory 
 
 80.   See 12 U.S.C. § 5518 (2018) (mandating that the Agency conduct a study to assess 
the impact of arbitration on consumers and authorizing it to prohibit or limit arbitration if it found that 
doing so would be “in the public interest and for the protection of consumers”); 81 Fed. Reg. 32,830, 
32,830 (May 24, 2016) (adopting a rule to “prohibit providers from using a pre-dispute arbitration 
agreement to block consumer class actions in court” and to require companies “to submit certain records 
relating to arbitral proceedings to the Bureau”). 
 81.   Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1627 (2018). 
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predispute arbitration clauses in auto-warranty agreements.82 In doing so, the 
FTC has invoked its statutory authority under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act 
to “prescribe rules setting forth minimum requirements for any informal dispute 
settlement procedure.”83 In 1975, the FTC looked at “the [Act]’s language, 
legislative history, and purpose,” with an eye towards “ensur[ing] that consumer 
protections were in place in warranty disputes.”84 It concluded that mandatory, 
binding, predispute arbitration was incompatible with the statute.85 In the face of 
disagreement in the courts over the legality of this rule,86 the FTC confirmed its 
position and rationale in 1999,87 and again as recently as 2015.88 
Securities and Exchange Commission (1979). One of the clearest and oldest 
examples of administrative regulation of arbitration comes from the Securities 
and Exchange Commission. Under the 1975 amendments to the Securities 
Exchange Act, Congress mandated that “[n]o proposed rule change shall take 
effect” without the SEC’s approval, and the SEC was authorized to “abrogate, 
add to, and delete from . . . the rules of a self-regulatory organization.”89 During 
the 1970s, to develop uniform arbitration rules, the SEC helped form the 
Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration.90 Its efforts resulted in the 
adoption of a Uniform Arbitration Code by all self-regulatory organizations.91 
Most recently, the SEC approved a rule change to clarify that collective actions 
brought by employees of member firms under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, or the Equal Pay Act may not be 
arbitrated.92 
Department of Labor (2000). Appealing to the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act, the Department of Labor has regulated arbitration for many 
years. Ever since 2000, the Department has required that workers who are denied 
benefits under plans covered by Title I not be subjected to mandatory arbitration 
unless they are allowed to challenge the arbitral decision.93 The agency appealed 
 
 82.   See 40 Fed. Reg. 60,168 (Dec. 31, 1975) (codified at 16 C.F.R. § 703.5 (2018) 
(“Decisions of [any informal dispute settlement procedure] shall not be legally binding on any person.”). 
 83.   15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(2) (2018). 
 84.   80 Fed. Reg. 42,710, 42,718 (July 20, 2015). 
 85.   40 Fed. Reg. 60,168, 60,190 (Dec. 31, 1975). 
 86.   See infra Section III.A. 
 87.   64 Fed. Reg. 19,700, 19,708 (Apr. 22, 1999). 
 88.   80 Fed. Reg. 42,710, 42,719 (July 20, 2015). 
 89.   15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1), (c) (2018). 
 90.   Jill I. Gross, Historical Basis of Securities Arbitration as an Investor Protection 
Mechanism, 1 J. DISPUTE RESOL. 171, 175-82 (2016); see also White Paper on Arbitration in the 
Securities Industry, SEC. INDUSTRY & FIN. MKT. ASS’N 11 (Oct. 2007), http://www.sifma.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/sifma-sifmacl-white-paper-on-arbitration-in-the-securities-industry.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/KNG8-NRWQ]. 
 91.   See, e.g., 44 Fed. Reg. 75,255 (Dec. 19, 1979) (National Association of Securities 
Dealers, Inc.); 44 Fed. Reg. 43,378 (July 24, 1979) (New York Stock Exchange); 44 Fed. Reg. 43,377 
(July 24, 1979) (Midwest Stock Exchange). 
 92.   77 Fed. Reg. 22,374 (Apr. 13, 2012). 
 93.   65 Fed. Reg. 70,246, 70,253 (Nov. 21, 2000) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-
1(c)(4) (2018)). 
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to the Act’s provision on “full and fair review” of an adverse-benefit decision,94 
with the goal of setting out protections that are “essential to [ensure] procedural 
fairness for a claimant who is offered or pursues voluntary administrative 
processes as an alternative to pursuing a claim in court.”95 The Department 
amended this rule in late 2017 and left the arbitration regulations untouched,96 
although at least one federal court has cast doubt on their validity.97 
Department of Agriculture (2004). To ensure a fair and efficient insurance 
marketplace, the Department of Agriculture clarified that arbitration between 
crop insurers and farmers is subject to judicial review.98 The agency relied on its 
general authority to interpret its substantive statute’s provision of a right to 
appeal the denial of a claim.99 The Department was addressing “numerous 
complaints from producers and the insurance companies . . . that arbitration is no 
longer inexpensive,”100 and concluded that binding “arbitration is inconsistent 
with section 508(j) of the [Federal Crop Insurance] Act, which gives producers 
the right to file judicial appeals within one year of the denial of the claim.”101 
There is no agreement in the courts on the scope of judicial review under this 
rule.102 Nonetheless, since its promulgation, this arbitration regulation has been 
reenacted many times—including three times under the Trump 
Administration.103 
Department of Transportation (2011). The Department of Transportation, 
relying on its broad authority to prohibit “unfair or deceptive practice[s]” in the 
air carrier industry,104 has banned restrictions on passengers’ right to sue airlines 
in court.105 The agency has strived to protect passengers on the belief that, “if a 
 
 94.   29 U.S.C. § 1133(2) (2018). 
 95.   65 Fed. Reg. 70,246, 70,254 (Nov. 21, 2000). 
 96.   82 Fed. Reg. 56,566 (Nov. 29, 2017). 
 97.   See Sanzone-Ortiz v. Aetna Health of California, Inc., No. 15-cv-03334, 2016 WL 
7732625, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2016) (“[E]ven if 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(c)(4) could be read as 
plaintiff contended (prohibiting mandatory arbitration for ERISA statutory challenges), the Department 
of Labor regulation was not based on a ‘congressional command’ that would override the Federal 
Arbitration Act’s mandate favoring arbitration agreements.”). 
 98.   69 Fed. Reg. 48,652, 48,654 (Aug. 10, 2004) (codified at 7 C.F.R. § 457.8 (2018)) 
(“Any decision rendered in arbitration is binding on you and us unless judicial review is sought in 
accordance with section 20(b)(3). Notwithstanding any provision in the rules of [the American Arbitration 
Association], you and we have the right to judicial review of any decision rendered in arbitration.”). 
 99.   7 U.S.C. § 1508(j) (2018). 
 100.   67 Fed. Reg. 58,912, 58,915 (Sept. 18, 2002). 
 101.   Id. at 58,916. 
 102.   See Campbell’s Foliage, Inc. v. Fed. Crop Ins. Corp., 562 F. App’x 828, 831 (11th 
Cir. 2014) (“We have not analyzed whether section 20(c) of the Common Provisions allows more 
expansive judicial review of arbitration awards than that permitted in section 10 of the FAA, and it appears 
that none of our sister circuits have addressed the issue. Nevertheless, we hold the district judge did not 
err by denying the motion to vacate the arbitration award.”). 
 103.   See 83 Fed. Reg. 11,633 (Mar. 16, 2018); 82 Fed. Reg. 55,731 (Nov. 24, 2017); 
82 Fed. Reg. 28,993 (June 27, 2017). 
 104.   49 U.S.C. § 41712(a) (2018). 
 105.   76 Fed. Reg. 23,110, 23,155 (Apr. 25, 2011) (codified at 14 C.F.R. § 253.10 
(2018)). 
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carrier reaches out to do business in a particular jurisdiction, . . . then it is fair 
and reasonable to expect that the carrier can defend itself against litigation 
brought by a consumer who resides in that jurisdiction.”106 As a result, under the 
unchallenged 2011 regulation, “[n]o carrier may . . . preclude a passenger . . . 
from bringing a claim against a carrier in any court of competent jurisdiction.”107 
Department of Treasury (2011). Following the enactment of the Dodd-
Frank Act, the Department of Treasury limited the arbitration of disputes arising 
out of foreign-currency, off-exchange transactions with retail customers. 
Congress authorized the Department to allow forex transactions only if subject 
to certain restrictions of the Agency’s choosing.108 So, in 2011, the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation decided to permit these transactions subject to a 
ban on predispute arbitration agreements between state banks and their 
customers.109 Similarly, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency prohibited 
national banks and federal branches of foreign banks from making the use of 
their services conditional upon a customer’s agreement to arbitrate.110 
2. 2016 Regulations 
Department of Labor. With the Federal Employees’ Retirement System 
Act, Congress gave authority to the Department of Labor to “grant a conditional 
or unconditional exemption of any fiduciary or transaction.”111 In 2016, the 
Agency promulgated a regulation mandating that, in order to be eligible for an 
exemption from a rule regarding conflicts of interest in retirement advice, 
investment advisors and others covered by the rule may not limit their customers’ 
“right to participate in a class action in court.”112 In enacting this rule, the 
Department of Labor concluded that the “ability to bar investors from bringing 
or participating” in a class action “would undermine important investor rights 
and incentives for Advisers to act in accordance with the Best Interest 
 
 106.   Id. 
 107.   Id. 
 108.   7 U.S.C. § 2(c)(2)(E)(ii)(I) (2018). 
 109.   76 Fed. Reg. 40,779, 40,787 (July 12, 2011) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 349.28(a) 
(2018)) (“No FDIC-supervised insured depository institution may enter into any agreement or 
understanding with a retail forex customer in which the customer agrees, prior to the time a claim or 
grievance arises, to submit such claim or grievance to any settlement procedure.”). 
 110.   76 Fed. Reg. 41,375, 41,381 (July 14, 2011) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 48.16(a)(1) 
(2018)) (“No national bank may enter into any agreement or understanding with a retail forex customer 
in which the customer agrees, prior to the time a claim or grievance arises, to submit such claim or 
grievance to any settlement procedure unless the following conditions are satisfied: Signing the agreement 
is not a condition for the customer to use the services offered by the national bank . . . .”). 
 111.   29 U.S.C. § 1108(a) (2018). 
 112.   See 81 Fed. Reg. 21,002, 21,020 (Apr. 8, 2016). 
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standard.”113 As the Trump Administration sought to delay the implementation 
of the rule,114 however, two federal courts enjoined this regulatory action.115 
Department of Education. Recognizing that many unscrupulous for-profit 
educational institutions have drained billions of dollars in taxpayer money,116 the 
Department of Education strived to streamline its borrower-defense rules. 
Invoking the authority to define defenses against loan repayments,117 the Agency 
prohibited schools participating in its direct loan program from entering into 
predispute agreements that mandate arbitration or waive students’ right to 
participate in class actions.118 The Agency’s goal was “to protect student loan 
borrowers from misleading, deceitful, and predatory practices of . . . institutions 
participating in the Department’s student aid programs.”119 And the Department 
felt that, since “the use of predispute agreements to arbitrate will [not] result in 
well-informed choices,” “predispute arbitration agreements, whether voluntary 
or mandatory, and whether or not they contain opt-out clauses, [] frustrate 
achievement of the goal of the regulation—to ensure that students who choose 
to enter into an agreement to arbitrate their borrower defense type claims do so 
freely and knowingly.”120 In 2018, however, the Department reversed course and 
“decided that the 2016 final regulations’ provisions on class action waivers and 
pre-dispute arbitration should not be included in [its new] proposed 
regulations.”121 
Department of Health and Human Services. Some agencies, instead, have 
taken a lighter-touch approach, striving to limit arbitration through conditional 
rules. For example, the Department of Health and Human Services issued 
regulations designed to help the families of those who suffered from neglect in 
nursing homes. In acting to limit arbitration, the Department invoked its general 
delegated authority to require that a facility “meets” certain “requirements” in 
 
 113.   Id. at 21,043. 
 114.   82 Fed. Reg. 31,278 (July 6, 2017) (seeking public input on whether to delay the 
January 1, 2018 applicability date of the Department of Labor fiduciary rule). 
 115.   Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.3d 360, 385 (5th Cir. 2018) 
(holding that the arbitration provision of this regulation impermissibly conflicted with the Federal 
Arbitration Act); Thrivent Fin. for Lutherans v. Acosta, No. 16-cv-03289, 2017 WL 5135552 (D. Minn. 
Nov. 3, 2017) (granting an injunction against enforcement of the arbitration regulation). 
 116.   See For Profit Higher Education: The Failure to Safeguard the Federal 
Investment and Ensure Student Success, U.S. SENATE HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS COMMITTEE 
(July 30, 2012), http://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/for_profit_report/PartI-PartIII-
SelectedAppendixes.pdf [http://perma.cc/4PY2-9HTZ]. 
 117.   20 U.S.C. § 1087e(h) (2018). 
 118.   See 81 Fed. Reg. 75,926, 76,028 (Nov. 1, 2016) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. § 
685.300(e)-(f)) (“The school will not seek to rely in any way on a predispute arbitration agreement or on 
any other predispute agreement with a student who has obtained or benefited from a Direct Loan, with 
respect to any aspect of a class action that is related to a borrower defense claim . . . . The school will not 
enter into a predispute agreement to arbitrate a borrower defense claim, or rely in any way on a predispute 
arbitration agreement with respect to any aspect of a borrower defense claim.”). 
 119.   Id. at 75,926. 
 120.   Id. at 76,028. 
 121.   83 Fed. Reg. 37,242, 37,245 (July 31, 2018). 
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order to receive federal Medicare or Medicaid funds.122 Indeed, under the 
Nursing Home Reform Act, a nursing facility receiving federal funds “must” 
agree to “protect and promote the rights of each resident” by complying with a 
list of substantive and procedural “Residents’ Rights.”123 The Agency decided 
that, to qualify for federal funds, a nursing facility could not enter into a 
predispute arbitration agreement with residents.124 Just before the rule came into 
effect, however, a district court in Mississippi enjoined it.125 In turn, the 
Department has recently proposed revisions to the rule, “remov[ing] provisions 
prohibiting binding pre-dispute arbitration and strengthen[ing] requirements 
regarding the transparency of arbitration agreements in [nursing home] 
facilities.”126 
Federal Communications Commission. The Federal Communications 
Commission sought comments on a rule that would prohibit broadband-internet 
service providers from compelling arbitration in their contracts with 
customers.127 The agency had “serious concerns about the impact on consumers 
from the inclusion of mandatory arbitration requirements as a standard part of 
many contracts for communications services.”128 But there has been no action on 
those comments, and it is therefore likely that this regulation will never see the 
light of day. 
 
*  *  * 
 
Pursuant to their general rulemaking authority, agencies have continued to 
regulate arbitration notwithstanding Supreme Court opinions expanding the 
scope of the FAA. There are two possibilities that might explain this state of 
affairs: either dozens of agencies are openly defying the courts (and have 
successfully gotten away with it for decades), or the Supreme Court has not 
completely preempted agencies’ ability to invoke their general rulemaking 
authority to regulate arbitral procedures. Part II addressed the extent of the 
former possibility; below, Part III focuses on the latter, arguing that existing 
precedent does not fully negate agencies’ authority to regulate arbitration. 
 
 122.   42 U.S.C. § 1396r(a)(3) (2018). 
 123.   Id. at § 1396r(c)(1)(A) (2018). 
 124.   81 Fed. Reg. 68,688 (Oct. 4, 2016) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 483.70(n)(1) (2018)) 
(“A facility must not enter into a pre-dispute agreement for binding arbitration with any resident or 
resident’s representative nor require that a resident sign an arbitration agreement as a condition of 
admission to the LTC facility.”). 
 125.   Am. Health Care Ass’n v. Burwell, 217 F. Supp. 3d 921, 931 (N.D. Miss. 2016) 
(reasoning that, although the judge could not “say with any high degree of confidence that the Rule will 
fall victim to a particular legal maxim, the overall state of authority in this context makes it seem unlikely 
that [the agency] will prevail”). 
 126.   82 Fed. Reg. 26,649, 26,649 (June 8, 2017). 
 127.   See 81 Fed. Reg. 87,274, 87,318 (Dec. 2, 2016); see also 81 Fed. Reg. 23,360, 
23,393 (Apr. 20, 2016). 
 128.   81 Fed. Reg. 87,274, 87,318 (Dec. 2, 2016). 
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III. Chevron Meets McMahon 
Federal agencies have promulgated rules on arbitration for decades. In the 
background, two parallel lines of jurisprudence evolved: Chevron deference and 
the McMahon arbitration doctrine. 
Chevron’s two-step test is familiar to most. First, “always, is the question 
whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the 
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as 
the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress.”129 Second, “if the court determines Congress has not directly 
addressed the precise question at issue, . . . [and] if the statute is silent or 
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether 
the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”130 If 
the substantive statute is ambiguous and the agency’s interpretation is 
permissible and reasonable, courts must defer to the agency. 
A few years after Chevron, Eugene and Julia McMahon brought tort, 
securities fraud, and racketeering claims against their brokerage firm, Shearson. 
The broker moved to compel arbitration pursuant to their customer agreement.131 
Notwithstanding the fact that Wilko v. Swan had declined to enforce an 
arbitration agreement that waived certain substantive rights under the Securities 
Exchange Act,132 the Supreme Court in McMahon upheld the validity of 
Shearson’s arbitration agreement. In doing so, the Court articulated the 
McMahon doctrine: “If Congress did intend to limit or prohibit waiver of a 
judicial forum for a particular claim, such an intent will be deducible from the 
statute’s text or legislative history, or from an inherent conflict between 
arbitration and the statute’s underlying purposes.”133 Over the years, the Court 
has consistently relied on this doctrine.134 
Even though Chevron predates McMahon by a couple of years, there is little 
clarity as to how the Court’s arbitration jurisprudence (in particular McMahon) 
interacts with its agency-deference case law (under Chevron). In a nutshell, while 
Chevron outlines those instances in which a court may defer to an agency’s 
interpretation of its substantive statute,135 McMahon sets out a test to identify 
whether a statute conflicts with arbitration.136 In the face of a conflict between 
 
 129.   Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). 
 130.   Id. at 843. 
 131.   Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1987). 
 132.   Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 430 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. 
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989). 
 133.   McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227. 
 134.   See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (“If 
such an intention exists, it will be discoverable in the text of the [Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act], its legislative history, or an inherent conflict between arbitration and the [Act]’s underlying 
purpose.”) (citing McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227). 
 135.   Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). 
 136.   McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227. 
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the FAA and another statute, the McMahon doctrine requires courts to look for 
any congressional intent to preclude arbitration. In the presence of an 
administrative regulation of arbitration, instead, Chevron asks whether there is 
any congressional intent to mandate arbitration. That is, Chevron’s presumption 
appears to be in favor of agency deference; McMahon’s presumption seems to 
be proarbitration.137 Courts have explicitly recognized the uncertainty 
surrounding the interaction of Chevron and McMahon.138 And the Supreme 
Court has yet to clarify it, even though the McMahon Court—while mandating 
arbitration—recognized the Securities and Exchange Commission’s authority to 
adopt “rules it deems necessary to ensure that arbitration procedures adequately 
protect statutory rights.”139 
This Part makes a first attempt at bringing some clarity to the debate, 
without offering a definitive answer. Section III.A discusses the few appellate 
decisions that have scrutinized an agency’s authority to regulate arbitration. It 
shows how the outcomes in those cases largely depended on whether the court 
relied exclusively on Chevron or also considered McMahon. Section III.B 
explains why Epic Systems should not be read as adopting the mistaken view that 
Chevron and McMahon are inexorably at odds. 
A. Challenges to Administrative Rules on Arbitration 
Interestingly, very few administrative rules on arbitration have been 
challenged. Recently, two Obama-era regulations have been enjoined in federal 
court—both on very fact-specific grounds. The Northern District of Mississippi 
blocked the Department of Health and Human Services’ rule that prohibited 
predispute arbitration agreements between nursing homes and residents.140 The 
district court couched its injunction on the finding that the Agency “presented 
insufficient justification for banning nursing home arbitration.”141 The Fifth 
Circuit’s ruling on the Department of Labor’s fiduciary rule was similarly 
narrow.142 The Department chose to permit arbitration as long as it did not 
preclude retirees’ right to participate in a class action in court.143 But the Fifth 
Circuit concluded that the rule conflicted with ERISA and, in any event, was 
 
 137.   Wiechens, supra note 15, at 1481. 
 138.   See, e.g., Seney v. Rent-A-Ctr., Inc., 738 F.3d 631, 635 (4th Cir. 2013) (“The way 
in which Chevron squares with McMahon . . . is uncertain, and courts have divided on the question.”). 
 139.   McMahon, 482 U.S. at 233-34. 
 140.   Am. Health Care Ass’n v. Burwell, 217 F. Supp. 3d 921, 931 (N.D. Miss. 2016). 
 141.   Id. at 934; see also id. at 936-37. 
 142.   Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.3d 360, 385 (5th Cir. 2018) 
(holding that the antiarbitration provision of this regulation impermissibly conflicted with the Federal 
Arbitration Act); Thrivent Fin. for Lutherans v. Acosta, No. 16-cv-03289, 2017 WL 5135552 (D. Minn. 
Nov. 3, 2017) (granting injunction against enforcement of the arbitration regulation). 
 143.   See supra notes 111-115 and accompanying text. 
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arbitrary and capricious.144 Neither court addressed the tension between Chevron 
and McMahon. 
But the challenges to the FTC’s restrictions on the use of mandatory 
predispute arbitration clauses in auto-warranty agreements did.145 And state and 
federal courts have split on whether the Commission may regulate arbitral 
procedures even though its substantive statute does not expressly mention 
arbitration. On the federal side, several district courts upheld the FTC’s 
interpretation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act as providing the authority to 
restrict arbitration of warranty claims.146 The Ninth Circuit temporarily joined 
that crowd, before the panel sua sponte withdrew its opinion pending a related 
decision by the California Supreme Court.147 Instead, other federal courts—
including the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits—refused to defer to the FTC.148 On the 
state front, at least three state supreme courts sided with the FTC rule,149 and five 
ruled against it.150 
From the judicial treatment of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, one 
conclusion can be drawn: courts erroneously believe that McMahon and Chevron 
are incompatible. Therefore, outcomes generally turn on whether Chevron is 
taken to be the primary test, or whether McMahon is also part of the picture. An 
approach exclusively grounded on Chevron will most likely result in a decision 
against arbitration. Instead, analyzing agency regulations under both Chevron 
and McMahon will likely lead to a ruling in favor of arbitration—because, all 
too often, McMahon swallows Chevron. 
Let me explain further. On one side of the debate, the argument is a 
straightforward application of administrative law principles. Under Chevron, 
courts will defer to the FTC’s interpretation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty 
Act unless (i) Congress has “directly spoken to the precise question at issue” or 
(ii) the FTC’s construction of the statute is unreasonable.151 Finding that the 
 
 144.   Chamber of Commerce, 885 F.3d at 379, 388. 
 145.   See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text. 
 146.   See Breniser v. W. Recreational Vehicles, Inc., No. cv-07-1418, 2008 WL 
5234528, at *6 (D. Or. 2008); Harnden v. Ford Motor Co., 408 F. Supp. 2d 300, 307 (E.D. Mich. 2004); 
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Imports, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 827, 831 (E.D. Va. 2002); Pitchford v. Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., 124 
F. Supp. 2d 958, 964 (W.D. Va. 2000). 
 147.   Kolev v. Euromotors W., 658 F.3d 1024, 1029 (9th Cir. 2011), withdrawn, 676 
F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 148.   Davis v. S. Energy Homes, Inc., 305 F.3d 1268, 1279-80 (11th Cir. 2002); Walton 
v. Rose Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F.3d 470, 479 (5th Cir. 2002); Jones v. Gen. Motors Corp., 640 F. Supp. 
2d 1124, 1137 (D. Ariz. 2009). 
 149.   See, e.g., Koons Ford of Balt. v. Lobach, 919 A.2d 722, 737 (Md. 2007); Simpson 
v. MSA of Myrtle Beach, Inc., 644 S.E.2d 663, 673 (S.C. 2007); Parkerson v. Smith, 817 So. 2d 529, 535 
(Miss. 2002). 
 150.   Borowiec v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 808 N.E.2d 957 (Ill. 2004); Abela v. Gen. Motors 
Corp., 677 N.W.2d 325 (Mich. 2004); Crawford v. Results Oriented, Inc., 548 S.E.2d 342 (Ga. 2001); In 
re Am. Homestar of Lancaster, Inc., 50 S.W.3d 480, 491-92 (Tex. 2001); Energy Homes, Inc. v. Ard, 772 
So. 2d 1131, 1135 (Ala. 2000). 
 151.   Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984). 
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statute is silent on mandatory arbitration, some courts have moved on to an 
assessment of the reasonableness of the FTC’s interpretation—and found it 
reasonable.152 Others simply concluded that Congress expressed an intent to 
preclude binding arbitration under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.153 
On the other side of the debate, the argument is equally simple: the FAA is 
a super-statute, and thus it swallows Chevron deference. For example, in striking 
down the FTC’s rule, the Eleventh Circuit made two moves. First, it concluded 
(under McMahon) that no intent to limit arbitration was “deducible from the 
statute’s text or legislative history, or from an inherent conflict between 
arbitration and the statute’s underlying purposes.”154 So, moving to Chevron step 
one, the panel found that, because “Congress failed to directly address binding 
arbitration in the text or legislative history,” the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act 
was ambiguous.155 Second, the court held that the FTC’s interpretation of its 
substantive act was unreasonable—because any such limit on arbitration is 
unreasonable—and therefore no deference was warranted.156 The Fifth Circuit, 
instead, reached the same conclusion much quicker. In light of the FAA’s pro-
arbitration policy, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act was not ambiguous, that 
is, it did not allow for restrictions on mandatory arbitration; therefore, the FTC’s 
interpretation failed under the first step of Chevron.157 
That the application of a judge-made test will be outcome determinative is 
hardly surprising. But this bipolar take on administrative regulation of arbitration 
risks confusing much of the Court’s administrative law and arbitration 
jurisprudence. Under either approach, Chevron or McMahon, courts are giving 
short shrift to one line of precedents. The existence of Chevron deference and 
the McMahon doctrine in two parallel (and seemingly incompatible) universes is 
puzzling—because, as I discuss below, they do (and ought to) overlap. 
B. How Not to Interpret Epic Systems 
This Section will show how, to the extent that Epic Systems addressed the 
Chevron-McMahon murky waters, it has not done so in a way that oversimplifies 
the Court’s arbitration jurisprudence. As I will argue, the Court’s arbitration 
decisions are not consistent with a requirement that agencies regulate arbitration 
only pursuant to specific delegated rulemaking authority. Many rules based on 
general delegations, such as those discussed in Section II.B.1, would likely 
survive judicial review even after Epic Systems. 
 
 152.   See, e.g., Kolev, 658 F.3d at 1026. 
 153.   See, e.g., Lobach, 919 A.2d at 735. 
 154.   Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987) (alternations 
omitted). 
 155.   Davis v. S. Energy Homes, Inc., 305 F.3d 1268, 1278 (11th Cir. 2002) (emphasis 
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 156.   Id. at 1277-80. 
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The three consolidated cases in Epic Systems concerned whether 
employment contracts containing class-action waivers are enforceable under the 
FAA or, instead, violate the employees’ rights to collective action under the 
NLRA.158 Epic Systems, a Wisconsin healthcare software company, required all 
employees to sign a policy containing a mandatory, individual arbitration clause 
for any labor dispute. The multinational accounting firm Ernst & Young and the 
petrochemical company Murphy Oil had similar policies.159 In each case, the 
employees sought to litigate Fair Labor Standards Act and related state law 
claims through collective actions in federal court.  
Federal courts of appeals are split. The Fifth Circuit mandated individual 
arbitration: in light of the federal policy favoring arbitration and the absence of 
any contrary evidence in the NLRA’s text, the court held that employers do not 
violate the text of the Act by requiring employees to sign an arbitration 
agreement containing collective-action waivers.160 By contrast, the Seventh 
Circuit161 and the Ninth Circuit162 upheld the employees’ rights to pursue class 
actions. Their reasoning was that Section 8 of the NLRA prohibits an employer 
from interfering with an employee’s right to engage in concerted activity, so the 
NLRA renders the waiver of class and collective proceedings illegal. Because 
the FAA’s own saving clause forecloses arbitration “upon such grounds as exist 
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract,” and because illegality is 
one of those grounds, a mandatory arbitration contract that strips away 
employees’ statutory rights to engage in concerted activity is unlawful and thus 
unenforceable.163 
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that arbitration agreements 
providing for individualized proceedings must be enforced—and that neither the 
FAA’s saving clause nor the NLRA suggests otherwise. The reasoning of the 
majority opinion is as follows. First, “by attacking (only) the individualized 
nature of the arbitration proceedings, the employees’ argument seeks to interfere 
with one of arbitration’s fundamental attributes,” and therefore does not fall 
under the FAA’s saving clause.164 Second, the NLRA does not override the 
FAA’s requirement that employment arbitration contracts be enforced because, 
in the NLRA, there is no “clear and manifest” congressional intention to displace 
the FAA.165 Class and collective actions are not “concerted activities” protected 
by Section 7 of the NLRA, because that statute does not mention class action 
procedures or even hint at a wish to displace the FAA.166 What is more, Justice 
 
 158.   Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018). 
 159.   Id. at 1619-21. 
 160.   Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 161.   Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 162.   Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 163.   See Epic Systems, 823 F.3d at 1157-61; Ernst & Young, 834 F.3d at 980-84. 
 164.   Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1622 (2018). 
 165.   Id. at 1624. 
 166.   Id. at 1625-26. 
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Gorsuch noted, the Court has rejected every effort to “conjure conflicts” between 
the FAA and other federal statutes.167 
Tangentially, Justice Gorsuch’s opinion states that, “even under Chevron’s 
terms, no deference is due” to the National Labor Relations Board’s 
interpretation because there is no “unresolved ambiguity” in the NLRA.168 The 
Court found that the Agency “has sought to interpret [its] statute in a way that 
limits the work of a second statute, the Arbitration Act.”169 But, according to the 
majority, “the absence of any specific statutory discussion of arbitration or class 
actions in the NLRA is an important and telling clue that Congress has not 
displaced the Arbitration Act.”170 Indeed, Justice Gorsuch wrote, Congress 
“knows how to override the Federal Arbitration Act when it wishes.”171 The 
majority then cites four recent statutory provisions that include explicit language 
limiting arbitration.172 It concludes that “Congress has instructed that arbitration 
agreements like those before us must be enforced as written . . . [and] it [has not] 
manifested a clear intention to displace the Arbitration Act.”173 Where there is 
no ambiguity, “Chevron leaves the stage.”174 
When it comes to administrative rules on arbitration, some might be 
tempted to claim that Epic Systems supports the conclusion that, unless Congress 
has delegated rulemaking authority over arbitration with explicit language, 
agencies are not authorized to regulate arbitration. Indeed, this position emerged 
from various briefs filed in Epic Systems.175 But there is no reason—short of 
engaging in Supreme Court forecasting176—to read Epic Systems as exempting 
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Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1358 (2018) (“[W]hether Chevron should remain is a question we may leave for 
another day”); see also Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring) (“Chevron seems no less than a judge-made doctrine for the abdication of the judicial duty.”); 
De Niz Robles v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1165, 1171 (10th Cir. 2015) (Gorsuch, J.) (“[O]ne might question 
whether Chevron step two muddles the separation of powers by delegating to the Executive the power to 
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 36, 2019 
876 
arbitration regulations from any kind of agency deference. Not only would that 
reading put an end to longstanding regulations of arbitration—for Congress has 
tended to include specific language on arbitration only recently, and only in the 
face of grave concerns over inadequate agency action.177 But, most importantly, 
requiring an explicit statutory directive to regulate arbitration would distort the 
Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence on which Epic Systems relies. 
Take CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood.178 In that case, the Court held that 
the Credit Repair Organization Act (CROA) does not preclude the arbitration of 
consumer suits.179 Justice Scalia’s reasoning was nuanced: statutes enacted at a 
time in which Congress was on notice about the Supreme Court’s post-1980s 
interpretation of the FAA would likely contain explicit language derogating from 
the FAA if Congress had any intent to preclude arbitration.180 “At the time of the 
CROA’s enactment in 1996, arbitration clauses in contracts of the type at issue 
here were no rarity.”181 In other words, because “[t]he CROA itself followed a 
series of this Court’s seminal decisions compelling arbitration,” including 
McMahon, “Congress had been ‘alerted’ much before these post-CROA statutes 
were passed.”182 And because the CROA included no mention of arbitration and 
only prohibited the waiver of “any right of the consumer under this 
subchapter,”183 the Court found no conflict with the FAA. CompuCredit thus 
says little concerning statutes enacted at a time in which Congress was not on 
notice about the Court’s proarbitration jurisprudence. 
And considering statutes that predate the FAA case law leads to another 
arbitration precedent: Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon. In examining the 
claims brought by the McMahons under the Securities Exchange Act, the Court 
acknowledged that it was dealing with “arbitration procedures subject to the 
SEC’s oversight authority.”184 In particular, the Court limited the applicability 
of its 1953 Wilko decision in light of “intervening regulatory developments.”185 
In 1975, in fact, the Securities Exchange Act was amended to mandate that “[n]o 
proposed rule change shall take effect” without the SEC’s approval and to 
authorize the SEC to “abrogate, add to, and delete from . . . the rules of a self-
regulatory organization.”186 The Court embraced these amendments, recognizing 
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how they gave the Commission “expansive power to ensure the adequacy of the 
arbitration procedures employed by the [self-regulatory organizations], . . . 
including the power to mandate the adoption of any rules it deems necessary to 
ensure that arbitration procedures adequately protect statutory rights.”187 The 
majority positively weighted how, “[i]n the exercise of its regulatory authority, 
the SEC has specifically approved the arbitration procedures of the New York 
Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, and the [National Association 
of Securities Dealers], the organizations mentioned in the arbitration agreement 
at issue in this case.”188 Against this backdrop, the Court held that “where, as in 
this case, the prescribed procedures are subject to the Commission’s [oversight] 
authority, an arbitration agreement does not effect a [impermissible] waiver of 
the protections of the Act.”189 
In conclusion, McMahon and CompuCredit appear to stand for the 
proposition that the analysis for statutes enacted before “arbitration clauses . . . 
[became] no rarity”190 only begins with the text. Rather than adopting a “plain 
text” requirement when assessing if a statute permits any regulation of 
arbitration, the Court recognized that intent to limit arbitration “will be deducible 
from the statute’s text or legislative history, or from an inherent conflict between 
arbitration and the statute’s underlying purposes.”191 In those cases, even in the 
absence of specific delegations of rulemaking authority, regulations of 
arbitration would seem to be compatible with McMahon, CompuCredit, and Epic 
Systems. 
Conclusion 
Thus far Chevron and McMahon have been applied in parallel and siloed 
universes (with occasional tendencies to swallow each other). But, as this Note 
has shown, there is no historical or doctrinal reason for this to be the case. In 
closing, then, I gesture at one possible solution. Just as some scholars have 
recently called for a reshaping of Chevron’s step-two analysis,192 I suggest that, 
in the arbitration context, Chevron step two could be harmonized with the 
McMahon doctrine. The test could be something like this: an agency may 
regulate arbitration procedures as long as, based on the “traditional tools of 
statutory construction,” the statute is ambiguous,193 and so long as the agency’s 
interpretation of its substantive statute is reasonable and permissible under 
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McMahon. In other words, under the Chevron-McMahon step two, an 
administrative rule on arbitration would be permissible if some intent to allow 
for the regulation of arbitration is “deducible from the statute’s text or legislative 
history, or from an inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute’s 
underlying purposes.”194 Any consideration of the policy favoring arbitration 
would not swallow Chevron deference and would be limited to step two.195 
In sum, when a statute unambiguously forecloses the agency’s ability to 
regulate arbitration, that is the end of the analysis. Similarly, when a statute 
unambiguously delegates to the agency specific rulemaking authority over 
arbitration (as discussed in Section II.A), that is the end of the analysis too. But 
when the statute is ambiguous, the analysis then turns on Chevron step two. And 
the question becomes whether the administrative regulation is permissible 
because of some intent to regulate arbitration that is deducible from the statute’s 
text, legislative history, or underlying purposes.196 Although courts have found 
agency rules unreasonable due to impermissible considerations adduced during 
the notice-and-comment process—such as reliance on now-overruled precedents 
disfavoring arbitration197—“it is rare for a court to set aside an agency 
interpretation in step two.”198 Incorporating McMahon into Chevron step two 
could add further bite to what otherwise often is an “anemic” analysis.199 And it 
could be one potential way of harmonizing the agency-deference and arbitration 
jurisprudences, without making every regulation of arbitration pursuant to an 
agency’s general rulemaking authority unreasonable or impermissible. 
But my proposed Chevron-McMahon step two is just one brief suggestion. 
This Note’s central contribution is simply to point out that the agency-deference 
jurisprudence and the arbitration case law are far from incompatible. Not only 
did McMahon rely on an agency’s ability to regulate arbitration in reaching its 
holding,200 but it is also the case that many agencies have been openly regulating 
arbitration for decades—though both facts have seemingly gone unnoticed. This 
Note thus shows the need to open a rigorous conversation around the intersection 
of agency deference and arbitration. Although the Court has not yet clarified the 
test that should apply to administrative regulations of arbitration pursuant to 
general delegations of rulemaking authority, those agency rules—permitting, 
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defining, limiting, or prohibiting arbitration—are longstanding and important 
features of our administrative state. 
